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A Russia Without Oligarchs 
Once the economic crisis ends, the Russian government will face the question of how to carry out 
privatization properly. 
 
As a result of the government's anti-crisis measures, its ownership in leading companies will certainly 
increase. But even if you go back several years before the crisis, it is clear that the government's 
nationalization measures have not made the economy more efficient. 
 
To be fair, the private sector was no better, particularly if you look at large enterprises. It is too early to 
draw any conclusions, but it is already evident that a few of the largest Russian financial and industrial 
conglomerates have added much value to the economy over the last decade. 
 
Moreover, thanks to cheap foreign credit and government support, a few large conglomerates are 
drowning in the huge debt they amassed. Nonetheless, with the help of their political influence, they are 
now seeking huge bailout assistance from the state. 
 
Once the crisis calms down, one of the most important questions will be how the state can conduct 
privatization so that private ownership gives the right motivation to managers while at the same time 
ensuring the end of the oligarch system in which the top businessmen have too much political influence.
 
The main problem in an oligarchic system is that a thin layer of top industrialists are able to seize their 
companies' profits due to the weak protection of property rights and ineffective and corrupt law 
enforcement agencies. They accumulate a controlling stake in the enterprises and gradually force out 
minority shareholders. The losses caused by ineffective and nontransparent corporate management will 
disappear only when a broad layer of mid-level and top managers are able to gain a majority of shares in 
the companies. 
 
There is no easy solution to this problem, but I can offer an idea that might help. Russia's top 
businessmen should be allowed to own single enterprises, but there should be strict controls to prevent 
them from building the oligarchic business empires that have defined Russian big business for so many 
years. It is no simple task for politicians with limited power to keep today's oligarchs in check, but if 
successful, this approach would eliminate the types of conflicts of political and business interests that 
exist in all oligarchies. 
 
At the same time, each individual business titan who owns a major enterprise -- even if he is a 
multibillionaire -- would be weak and insignificant in comparison to the government as a whole. This 
would clearly be better than having a few ruling oligarchs who understood that the most profitable 
investment was in politics. Once they were able to influence government policies, they set the country on 
a completely reckless, ineffective economic course. 
 
There is another measure that is crucial to prevent the emergence of oligarchic business empires: 
Oligarchs should no longer be able to control banks. At the same time, the government should help 
ensure that corporate lending comes from several major banks. In this kind of economy, Russian banks 
would play a role similar to that of banks in Germany, where the government, not individuals, holds 
controlling stakes in the banks. Over time, those banks would have a stabilizing influence on the 
economy. Because numerous businesses borrow from them, they would be less vulnerable to the 
demands of any single borrower. Sberbank is a good example of how a leading government-controlled 
bank can play a positive role in the economy. 
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